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The conventional theory of economic policy has been revised to ant
take account of forward-looking expectations formed in the private sector
and John Driffill (1982) has shown how 'rational' expectations in the
foreign exchange market affect optimal monetary policy in a small open
economy. For large open economies with substantial spillover effects, exd
policy may need to take into account overseas reactions. National policy is 1
makersmay thus find themselves in a strategic relationship with each other
as well as with private market speculators. pn
In a number of papers Koichi Hamada analysed the relations between fol
national economic policy makers as a static game, contrasting non- an
cooperative Nash or Stackelberg outcomes with those which might be an
achieved by co-operation, see Hamada (1979) and references therein, of
Recently, Oudiz and Sachs (1984) have made a bold attempt to estimate co
the potential benefits of international policy co-ordination, treating policy loijj
formation as a static game.
The dynamic aspects of economic interdependence emphasised by
Hamada and Sakurai (1978) have invited the application of dynamic game
theory, where policy makers minimise costs over an extended period of
time. The papers by Sachs (1983) and Turner (1984) effectively complement to
the work of Hamada and Sakurai by treating the policy variables as the foll
instruments in a Nash dynamic game. m4'
While it is true that these models include dynamic elements, they exclude
aStackelberg leader, and there
are no forward-looking elements in private sector behaviour to take
account of in designing policy. (The exchange rate is determined only by
the current account, assuming zero capital mobility.) In an earlier paper,
Miller and Salmon (1983), methods for solving dynamic games with both
of these characteristics were described, with particular emphasis on the
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analogybetween a Stackelberg leader in an open loop dynamic game and
a government announcing policy to a market with forward looking
expectations. It was noted that such 'asymmetries' lead to the time
inconsistency of optimal policy —thetemptation for a leader to depart
from previously announced plans when the announcement effects of policy
upon 'forward looking' followers have been achieved.
In the absence of precommitment, however, such time inconsistent
optimal policy lacks credibility. In this paper, therefore, we focus on how
various time consistent solutions may be obtained and computed for
situations involving both strategic asymmetry and forward-looking
expectations.
To characterise the relations between policy makers, we examine first
the symmetric equilibria of Nash differential games, both open and closed
loop. We then consider the open and closed ioop Stackelberg equilibria
to arising when one of the players is elevated to the status of leader, but
br constrained to implement time consistent policies. As between the govern-
• ments and forward looking markets (here the foreign exchange market)
en two alternatives are considered. Either policy makers treat the path of the
:ts, exchange rate as given in determining their policy, or the exchange rate
- is taken to be a given linear function of the state of the system.
A general description of the various solutions obtained in this way is
provided in Section 1 with technical details available in the Annex. In the
following section a two-country version of the model proposed in Buiter
and Miller (1982) is introduced and a number of these equilibria computed
be and compared given fairly standard objectives with respect to the control
in, of inflation and output. This relatively unfavourable performance of
ste co-ordinated policy in this application doubtless reflects the absence of any
icy long run 'conflict of objectives', a point to which we return in conclusion.'
I Time consistent equilibria
of After a brief account of the linear dynamic system and the quadratic costs
to be minimised, we describe a number of time consistent equilibria, which
he follow from varying both relationships prevailing between the policy
makers themselves as well as those prevailing between the policy makers
•de and private markets. Technical details are available in the Annex.
.ke (a) Linear dynamics and quadratic costs
by Throughout this paper we assume a constant parameter linear
er, differential equation system of the form
)th
:he Dx(t) =Ax(t)+B1u(t)+B,v(t) (1)
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where x(t) is a vector of 'state' variables
u(t) is the vector of 'control' variables associated with player 1 fo
v(t) is the vector of 'control' variables associated with player 2
Disthe differential operator, Dx
at s
The state vector x(t) is partitioned between those variables x1(t) which r
are predetermined at time t, and those x2(t) which are not. The latter
represent forward-looking asset prices which discount expected future
events and move flexibly as 'news' about such events arrives. (Time th4
subscripts may be omitted from the vector notation where convenient.)
Each of two policy makers ('players') minimises a quadratic cost




[xT(s)uT(s) vT(s)] u(s)dsi =1,2 (2)
v(s) t
where ispositive semi definite, I =1,2
posi1ivee ni e
and the integral is assumed to converge without discounting.
(b) Strategic relations between policy makers
To focus upon the relationships between policy makers, we first
describe open and closed loop Nash and Stackelberg differential games on su
the assumption that the entire state vector is predetermined.
The Nash equilibria are familiar, see Basar and Olsder (1982), and can
be briefly described. The first occurs when each player takes the entire gi4
future path of the other's controls as given when computing his or her own
controls. Thus in choosing u(t), tt0 to minimise V1(t0)subjectto the
dynamics of the system described by equation (1) player one takes x(t0)
and v(t), t as given; while player two in minimising V2(t0) takes as given
the path for u(t), t The Open Loop Nash equilibrium is defined by
W
therequirement that the control path which each player takes as
predetermined should match what the other player chooses as optimal.
The second form of Nash equilibrium which we compute occurs when
each player responds to the current state of the system and recognises that is
the other player is responding likewise. Specifically player 1 minimises V1 ar4
by choosing a closed loop or feedback rule for u on the hypothesis that
player two operates a linear rule v =R2x, while player 2 minimises Co
assuming u =R1x. The Closed Loop Nash equilibrium is defined by the
requirement that the feedback rule either player assumes for the other
should in fact be the optimal current state feedback rule for that other whPolicy coordination and dynamic games 187
player. While it is straightforward to compute the open ioop Nash solution
for a linear quadratic game, the feedback rules required for the closed ioop
solution have to be found iteratively. The procedure used in this paper is
to compute optimal rulesAforplayers one and two conditional on
some arbitrary initial values for R1 and R2 (typically zero). These optimal
ch rules replace the initial estimates, and this procedure is repeated until
:er convergence is achieved.
tre So far both players have been treated symmetrically but we now consider
ne the consequences of one player acting as a Stackelberg leader. One
) immediateconsequence is that if player 1 is in the position of announcing
,st at t0apath for his controls u(t), t)t0, conditionalupon which player 2
will choose v(t), tt0, the optimal path for u is time inconsistent; so that
recalculating an optimal plan at a later date t1>t0 willnot produce a
continuation of the chosen path for u.
(2) Simaan and Cruz (1973), who used the maximum principle to compute
the time inconsistent optimal solution for the linear quadratic Stackelberg
differential game, argued that time consistent optimal plans could be
obtained by using dynamic programming methods (cf. also Cruz (1975)
for a general discussion of the class of Stackelberg equilibria generated in
this way).
However, Cohen and Michel (1984) have recently shown that the
maximum principle may also be used to obtain the time consistent solution
for the Open Loop Siackelberg game by imposing an appropriate constraint
rst on the leader's optimisation. Thus while choosing u to minimize V1(t0)
on subject to
an Dx=Ax+B1u+B2v (3)
ire given x(t0) and the follower's first order conditions, namely
3H°/3v =0-4v = x +u + (4)
Dp2 =alP/ax (5)




at is the follower's Hamiltonian generates the time inconsistent solution, they
V1 argue that the optimal time consistent solution can be obtained by
at choosing u to minimise V1(t0) given x(10) subject to (3), (4) and the
constraint that
he
er p2 =Ox (6)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Policy coordination and dynamic games 189
It is clear that the result is time consistent, since substitution of (4) and
(6) into (3) implies that the leader faces an orthodox single controller
problem. The remarkable feature of Cohen and Michel's procedure is that
it generates the 'dynamic programming' solution, because the constraint
on P2reflectsthe restriction on the leader's choice of controls imposed by
Bellman's principle of optimality. (The calculation of the appropriate value
for 0 may be achieved by using the iterative procedures already
mentioned.)
The last time consistent equilibrium to be described is for a Stackelberg
game where each player is aware of the other's feedback rule, but the leader
is, in addition, able to exploit the follower's reaction function, see Basar
and Haurie (1982). It is the leader's ability, by his current choice of u, to
affect the follower's choice of v that makes the game asymmetric and
distinguishes it from the closed loop Nash equilibrium. Thus while player
2 minimises frsubject to u =R1x, the leader minimises V1 subject to both
v =R2x and(4), the follower's reaction function. The Feedback Srackelberg
equilibrium is defined by the requirement that the feedback rules assumed
for the other player are optimal for that player.
In table 5. 1 we summarise the strategic constraints which these four
relationships impose on the optimisation problem facing each player, in
addition to the state equation (3) and the initial value x(10) common to
both players. The conditions which must be satisfied in equilibrium by the
feedback rules, R1, R2, and the time consistency constraint, 0, appearing
in the Table are spelt out in Annex 1.
(c) Policy co-operation with market anticipations
In this section we consider co-operative equilibria calculated by
postulating a single 'policy-coordinator' who minimises the weighted sum
of V1 and V2 given a state vector which contains 'forward-looking' asset
prices, x2, as well as predetermined variables, x1.
If the policy co-ordinator, starting at timeand acting as a Stackelberg
leader vis-à-vis private markets, were to choose paths u(t), v(t), I soas
to minimise the weighted sum of V1(I0)and subject to all of the state
equations
Dx1 =A11x1 + A12 x2 + B11 u+ B12 v (3a)
Dx2 =A21x1+A22x2+B21u+B22v (3b)
given x1(I0), with x2(t0) responding to the announced policy, then the
resulting plan would be time inconsistent in the absence ofprecommitments.
So we seek time consistent alternatives.
One is the 'loss of leadership' solution proposed by Buiter (1983) where190 Marcus Miller and Mark Salmon
the policy coordinator treats the path of asset prices as predetermined when
designing policy. Specifically the weighted sum of V1(t0)andV2(t0) is
minimised subject to (3a) (the state equations for x1), but given x1(10) and
t0. Equilibriumis defined by the requirement that the assumed
path of asset prices be a correct discounting of the chosen policy, so that
the remaining state equations for x2 will also be satisfied. As the label
suggests, this approach achieved time consistency by denying the leader
the asymmetric position initially assumed, and postulating instead a type
of Nash equilibrium.
Time consistent policy which is compatible with strategic asymmetry
may, however, be determined by applying Bellman's principle of optimality.
Proceeding by analogy with Cohen and Michel (1984), we assume that
co-operative policy will, in this infinite horizon linear-quadratic context,
be constrained to a fixed linear feedback rule, which may be found by
replacing the state equations (3b) in the time inconsistent solution by an
appropriate constraint of the form
x2=00x1 (7)
so co-operative policy will minimise the weighted sum of Vj(t0) and V2(t0)
subject to (3a) and (7), given x1(t0). As for the analogous open loop
Stackelberg constraint, equation (7) must in equilibrium generate values
for x2 which correctly discount the optimal policy, so that the remaining
state equations are satisfied. The calculation ofiS discussed further below
and in Miller and Salmon (1985).
(d) Non-cooperative policy with market anticipations —asummary
Finally we consider the nature of the time consistent equilibria
which arise from various forms of non-cooperative behaviour in a dynamic
setting with forward-looking financial markets. A summary is presented
in Table 5.2, which indicates the constraints on optimisation.
The derivatives appearing in the first two rows come from the strategic tH
constraints shown in Table I above. Thus the entries in the top of column
(1) indicate that, for the Open Loop Nash game where player one takes
the other's control v(t), t aspredetermined, both and av/3x1 In1
are assumed to be zero by player one. In columns (2) and (4) we show the
feedback coefficients assumed by each player to characterise the behaviour
of the other in closed loop equilibrium.
Where player one acts as a Stackelberg leader, he or she can exploit the
reaction function of the follower, namely
v = u+x + P2

























Policy coordination and dynamic games
as discussed in the preceding section.
191
is




Strategic Open Closed(3) (4)
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Notes. ax1denotes predetermined state variables, x2 'asset prices'
bPlayerone acting as leader
Arising from alternative assumptions as to the relationship between policy
makers and forward looking asset prices.
loop Stackelberg case, the leader uses this reaction function together with
the constraint that
P2= Ox
incalculating the feedback rule for the follower.
It is important to note that the relevant state vector for all the feedback
rules is only x1. As we indicate symbolically in the last line the variables
x2 are either treated as predetermined or as linear functions of x1, given
by
x2= 00x1192 Marcus Miller and Mark Salmon
II Anti-inflationary monetary policy in a two-country setting 1
The notion that a floating exchange rate would ensure that money was
neutral in its effects was challenged by Dornbusch (1976) who, in a model
with floating rates and perfect capital mobility, showed that temporarily
rigid ('sticky') goods and/or factor prices were enough to ensure substantial
non-neutrality in the short run. Hamada and Sakurai (1978), in a
two-country model with the same short run stickiness of nominal factor
prices but with zero capital mobility, showed how domestic monetary
policies could generate spillover effects overseas despite freely floating
rates.
It is naturally a matter of some interest to see what such interdependence
implies for the design of policy in general and for the gains to policy
co-ordination in particular. While non-cooperative commercial policy can
evidently inflict considerable welfare losses, recent analysis using the
Hamada/Sakurai framework (of countries linked only by trade in goods)
suggests that this may not carry over to macroeconomic policy coordination,
see Paul Turner (1984).. In this paper, therefore, we investigate some
implications of policy interdependence on an environment where two
countries (with a floating exchange rate but sticky factor/goods prices) are
linked by both trade and capital flows —indeedcapital is assumed to be
perfectly mobile.
The structure used is that developed for one country in Buiter and Miller N4
(1982),to which the reader is referred for more complete discussion, —4
Briefly, there is a 'Keynesian' determination of aggregate production, an
augmented Phillips curve governing inflation, and perfect capital mobility
with forward looking expectations in the foreign exchange market. (The
design of time inconsistent optimal policy in a single open economy of this
sort has already been comprehensively analysed by Driffill (1982)).
(a) Economic model and policy objectives
Definition of variables, and of notation used
irate of change of consumer price index eqj
ir'core' inflation de"
youtput (in logs), measured from 'natural rate' an'
zintegral of past output
c'competitiveness' for home country (in logs), i.e. real price of oi4
foreign goods
rreal consumption rate of interest 'c
p8costate (for state variable s) re
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Table 5.3. Economic model and policy objectives










Accumulation Dr =y DZ*= y










re H =fiur+y Dz*H* =fin+Y +p Dr
•be 2 2
er Note. aBysubstitution y =
K(1
In
ty VLoss function, integral of costs
he Ddifferential operator, Dx =dx/dt
Eexpectations operator
subscript a denotes average
subscript d denotes difference
superscript *denotesvariable pertaining to foreign country
The equations of the model are listed in Table 5.3. The first pair of
equations show local output being 'demand determined' where demand
depends on the real consumption rate of interest, on the real exchange rate
and on the level of real output overseas. (This is something of a 'reduced
form' where the dependence of demand on local output has been solved
of out.) The next pair of equations show that the rate of change of the
consumer price index in each country depends on demand pressure, on
'core' inflation and on the change in the real exchange rate (whereo
represents the share of imports in the price index).
Core inflation is itselfdetermined as the weighted sum of two components:
a • • •TT
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a backward looking integral of past output and the current level of the
real exchange rate. The latter is in turn a 'forward looking' integral of —
expectedinternational real interest rate differentials, as implied by the
arbitrage condition. —
Wecharacterise the stance of domestic monetary policy simply by the
level of the domestic real interest rate, and it is assumed that policy makers
aim to minimise the undiscounted integral of a quadratic function of
output and core inflation. Although no direct 'costs' are attached to the
level of the real interest rates, the structure of the model implies that F
welfare in each country depends on domestic and overseas interest rates,
in addition to the 'state variables' z,and c.
(b)Co-ordinated Policy
It is easiest to begin the study of policy design with cooperative
behaviour for, as we have seen, this can be treated as a single-controller
problem by the convenient fiction that a 'policy co-ordinator' chooses r
andr*tominimise the weighted average of national welfare costs, V
and V*.
The necessary conditions for such a coordinator minimising an equally w
weightedsum are shown in Table 5.4, for the time-inconsistent optimal
policy on the right and for time consistent policy on the left. Note that
time consistency has been achieved by simply droppingthe costate
variable for the real exchange rate, and replacing this by the assumption
that the latter is a stable function of the state variables, i.e.
c__Oiz+02z*
(The appropriate choice of to ensure that Bellman's principle is
satisfied are discussed below). For the 'Nash' time consistent alternative,
where the policy co-ordinator treats the real exchange rate as completely f
predetermined independently of his actions and of the state variables, C
thenecessary conditions are obtained by settingandto zero, in
Table 5.4.
The numerical results2 produced by the choice of an arbitrary, but
plausible, set of parameter values namely
are shown in Table 5.5. While all three policies possess a stable root of
unity, time inconsistent policy has two others larger in absolute size. Each
of the two time consistent policies has only one other stable root, less than 10'
unity in absolute size in both cases.
The Riccati coefficients in the table describe how the real exchange rate ml
is related to the state variables along the stable path associated with these
roots, and the so-called reaction coefficients provide the same information
IPolicy coordination and dynamic games
of
Table 5.4. Coordinated policy
Time consistent Time inconsistent
1 0.8350.8351Iz
rf = 1.0480.285 I
r* J 0.2851.048 j
State variables z, C





































Notes: State variables z, c
Costatevariables
In equilibrium c =z + 02
for the real interest rates. Thus for the 'Nash' equilibrium tabulated in











As might be expected from the symmetry of the two economies, for all three
solutions we find zandhave Riccati coefficients which are equal but of
opposite sign and possess symmetric reaction coefficients.
These coefficients are used to calculate the initial values shown in the
an lower half of the table, assuming an inherited rate of core inflation of 10%
in the home country and zero overseas. All three policies respond with real
ate interest rates of about 10% at home and 3% overseas, which implies an
ese initial loss of competitiveness of about 8% for the inflationary economy.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9198 Marcus Miller and Mark Salmon
between the welfare costs arising under these policies. That the time
inconsistent policy should generate the least cost is only to be expected.
What is ofmore interest is that the time consistent 'Stackelberg' equilibrium
is dominated by the 'Nash' equilibrium in this case.
The distinction between these last two policies can best be seen by a
transformation of variables.3 By forming'averages', SOYa and
'differences', y_y*, and assuming= the system under
control is decomposed into two separate blocs each involving but a single
stable root, as shown in Table 5.6.
The system of averages with its root of unity is common to both time
consistent solutions. Since the stable eigenvector is thisimplies that
Ya Zasothe world average recession is equal in percentage terms to
world average inflation, both declining with a unit root. Where the policies
are distinct, of course, is in connection with the exchange rate which enters
the other sub-system. To obtain the 'Nash' equilibrium, the parameter
in Table 5.6 is set equal to zero, which generates a root of —0.9 13, as we
haveseen,and aRiccaticoefficientof—0.835,asc =
(z_z*)= —0.835zealongthe stable path. If one constrains the value of
(= assumedby the policy co-ordinator to match the Riccati
coefficient of the system, one obtains the root of —0.842and the Riccati






The solutions which emerge when the national policy makers set
real rates in a non-cooperative fashion are examined in this section and
provide some surprises.
Where the two monetary authorities are on an equal strategic footing
the necessary conditions for optimisation for the resulting Nash games are
given in Table 5.7. For the Closed Loop Nash equilibrium the overseas aui
authority acts as if r = and the home government acts as if OUJ
P21 z+p22where these feedback coefficients satisfy constraints
discussed in the Annex. For the Open Loop Nash game, of course, these
feedback coefficients are omitted. 07
As before, two variants of the perceived relationship between policy COSt.
makers and the foreign exchange market may be considered. If the C
monetaryauthorities take the exchange rate as predetermined in designing
interest rate policy (soand 02 are zero in Table 5.7), the result of
decentralising policy is easy to describe. It has no effect! Both non- tol
cooperative Nash equilibria will be the same as that shown for co- dia
ordinated policy in the first column of Table 5.5. The reason for this is
Z('Policy and games









'State' variables (3) z, c
'Costate' variables (4) Pz' Pz" P1*, p*




thatignoring the impact of interest rates on the exchange rate leaves the
authorities free to neutralise the impact of foreign rates on domestic
output. The latter is then steered along the optimal path, whatever the
behaviour of foreign rates.
Where the policy makers do take account of the effect of interest rates
on the exchange rate, then the outcomes are as shown in the first, two
columns of Table 5.8,wherethe time consistent constraint on optimisation
c = 01z+02z*, is restricted to match the Riccati coefficients (and the
parameter values are as before). In comparison with the coordinated policy
outcome shown in column 2 of Table 5.5, the roots have moved closer
together and the matrix of the reaction coefficients has a more dominant
diagonal. The general nature of the. policy response to z(t0) = 10%,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9Policy coordination and dynamic games 201
at home and about 3% overseas, leaving the domestic economy 'uncom-
petitive' by about 8%.
The welfare costs are correspondingly not very different, but they are
in fact marginally lowerfordecentralised policy that was the case for
coordinated policy. The reason why the best efforts of the policy coordinator
may failto improve welfare is that the values of 01,02 taken as
predetermined do in fact vary with the structure of decision making.
In the remainder of Table 5.8 we report the time consistent solutions
for asymmetric games with the home country acting as Stackelberg leader.
In these cases 02, andthe reaction coefficients are no longer
symmetric.
Giventhattheoverseasreactionfunctionisoftheform
r"=_?lr+( thenecessary conditions for the
FeedbackStackelberg solutionare obtained from those for Closed Loop
Nash by adding an extra term to the expression for t3H/arinthe
top left of the Table 5.7. For OpenLoop Stackelberg thenecessary
conditions for Open Loop Nash are modified in the same way and in
addition terms equivalent to p21 and P22 in Table 5.7 are calculated from
the reaction function above and the Riccati coefficients forp and c.
Thenumerical results for the asymmetric equilibria hardly differ from
those for their symmetric counterparts also appearing in Table 5.8.
Perhaps the most interesting feature to note is that the costs to the
Stackelberg leader increaseineach case (compare values for V in columns
one and three, and in columns two and four). As in the policy co-ordination
problem treated earlier, it seems preferable nottoadopt a leadership role.
(d) Summary and Interpretation of Results
Key features of four of the outcomes can be seen by charting the
loss of competitiveness in the home country against the'difference'
between cumulated excess demand at home and overseas. (Only those
solutions which share a common unit root for the 'averages' are shown
in Figure 5.1, which is not to scale.)
In all four cases there is a significant initial loss of competitiveness. The
path starting from A representing the time inconsistent policy is, unlike
the others, governed by two stable roots and consequently shows a
changing ratio of competitiveness toThisratio moves towards (minus)
I as the trajectory approaches asymptotically the 450line(which happens
to be the eigenvector associated with the smaller of the two stable roots).
The time inconsistency of this policy is immediately apparent: reopti-
misation atwhen zdhasreached zd(tL),wouldlead to the selection of a































A: Time Inconsistent Optimal Co-ordinated Policy
B: Time Consistent Coordinated Policy (Zd= O,c)
C: Time Consistent Co-ordinated Policy (c given)
D: Time Consistent Open Loop Nash Game (Zd= 81c)
5.1 Policy coordination and the real exchange rate
A to the origin. As this involves some restoration of competitiveness it is
evident that, in reoptimising, the policy co-ordinator is tempted to reduce
interest differentials below what were promised at timeConsequently
optimal policy appears to involve a cut in the initial level of competitiveness
and core inflation in the home economy achieved by a path of interest
differentials skewed into the future so as to limit the impact on current
domestic output.
Imposing the constraint of time consistency on the policy co-ordinator
prevents this skewed pattern of interest differentials. As a result, the initial
spread of rates is increased to%thoughthe initial loss of competitiveness
falls to 7.90%, see Table 5.5 and the path starting at B. The use of interest
differentials to affect cdirectlyis ruled out by the assumption that c= Oj
andthe indirect effect of high interest differentials is to reduce the loss of
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as given, this inhibition is removed and both the initial interest differential
and the initial loss of competitiveness increase (see path from point C in
the figure).
Since the welfare costs fall when the exchange rate is taken as given in
this way, it appears that the perceived ability to exert an influence on the
exchange rate is, in the absence of precommitment, counter-productive.
This may help to explain why welfare costs also fall in the non-cooperative
Open Loop Nash case as lack of co-ordination seems to 'weaken' this time
consistency constraint and allows for the choice of policies with higher
initial interest differentials, and a greater loss of competitiveness (see path
from point D).
It is not, of course, always true that the power to affect the exchange
rate proves counter-productive in this way. In an example of fiscal policy
co-ordination, Miller and Salmon (1985), we find that it pays the policy
co-ordinator to act as a (time-consistent) leader in the foreign exchange
markets; and in this case coordinated policy dominates the non-cooperative
Nash alternative.
Conclusion
The focus of this paper is on the computation of time consistent
equilibria in continuous time 'rational expectations' models where there
is more than one decision maker. As an illustration, we have examined the
choice of interest rate policies in two countries linked by trade and capital
movements with a perfectly flexible exchange rate.
The loss function which policy makers seek to minimise includes only
the squared deviation of domestic output from its stable inflation level and
the square of core inflation, defined as a moving average of inflation. Such
objectives do not, of course, involve any long-run international 'conflict
of interest': in each country the equilibrium level of output is determined
by the long-run Phillips curve and the floating rate allows for the desired
inflation rate to be achieved without coordination.
What gains there may be from coordination must come therefore, in
choosing the path towards equilibrium and not in the final equilibrium
itself. For the model specified here, however, when the path of the exchange
rate is taken to be predetermined in designing policy, there are no such
dynamic gains to coordination. And where effects of interest rates on the
exchange rate are recognised, coordination so alters the time consistency
constraint that average welfare declines marginally, cf. Rogoff (1983)
where coordination of monetary policy delivers worse outcomes than
decentralised policy.
The failure to reap dynamic benefits from coordination in this case
doubtless depends on the particular features of the model, especially the
J204 MarcusMiller and Mark Salmon
feature that time consistent Stackelberg leadership in setting interest rates
appears to be uniformly unattractive in this floating rate environment.
While it is surely useful to focus on these purely dynamic aspects of the
problem, it has to be recognised that a more realistic appraisal of the merits
of coordination should also make due allowance for international 'conflicts
of interest' which persist even in equilibrium, as discussed, for example,
by Canzoneri and Gray (1983) and Turner (1983).
su
Annex. Deriving time consistent equilibria in symmetric and asymmetric
dynamic games
In this Annex we derive the four equilibria for full information linear
quadratic differential games discussed in the text. In order to focus on the
strategic relations between the players, the state vector is taken to be ex
entirely predetermined. The first of the symmetric solutions is for the Open he
Loop Nash game, where each player takes as given the other's sequence
of policy actions. This is followed by Closed Loop Nash game where each
player takes the other's policy rule as given (such rules being restricted to
current state feedback only). Where one player is dominant, there are two
analogous time consistent solutions, the Open Loop and Feedback wh
Stackelberg equilibria. (F
The integrals to be minimised are assumed to converge without dis-
counting. By using the 'current value' Hamiltonian and 'current value'
shadow prices, these solutions can without difficulty be extended to
incorporate discounting if required. Likewise the restriction to only two
players is not essential.
1.1Openloop Nash
Each player is assumed to choose the time path of his or her own
control variable(s) so as to minimise the integral of a quadratic cost
function defined on the variables of a linear differential equation system,
conditional on the assumption that the entire path of the other player's
sol control variable is given.
Since the behaviour of the two players is symmetric, the analysis need
only be carried out in detail for the one of them, denoted 1, with a quadratic
cost function defined on the set of 'state' variables x, his own controls u,
and those of the second player, v. Note that the weights in this function,
denoted by the matrix Q1below,incorporate any costs attached to other
('output') variables which have been eliminated by substitution in reducing
the cost function to one involving only the state variables and the
controls.
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es Thus, for the infinite horizon case, player I has to solve the following
standard dynamic optimisation problem:
he x(t)
its wT(s)Qi w(s)ds, where w(t) u(t), (1)
:ts u2
le v(t)
subject to the linear differential 'state' equation
x(t) =Ax(t)+ B1 u(t) + B2v(t), where x (2)
given x(t0) and v(z),tt0. The coefficients of the symmetric matrix Q1are
assumed to satisfy the usual positive definiteness conditions to ensure that
:he costs are positive and that the values of the control are bounded. (The
•be explicit time-indexing of the elements of w is, for convenience, dropped
en henceforth).
ice Using Pontryagin's maximum principle to solve this problem, the
•Ich appropriate Hamiltonian for player 1 is
to H' = w)+p?'(Ax + B1 u + B2 v) (3)
LCk wherep1 is a vector of 'costates', and hence the first order conditions





= = 0 (6)
)st Since the second player is, in fact, choosing his path for v conditional
on u being given, the Nash equilibrium may be obtained as the simultaneous
r solution of these two optimisation problems. To this end, the state
• d
equation and the FOC's of both players (bearing in mind that those of the
second player will be symmetric to those of player 1 already described) are
tic first collected together as follows:
U
)fl, x A 0 0B, B2 x
—. () ATA icr p1
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The paths for the states and costates can be more simply described,
however, if the control variables are eliminated by substitution. Thus from
(7) we obtain
ri-I n1-i rn Br 1X







lviI.,j IPi (9) rn
L.JL vx Vp1 vp2
th
Hence we can express (7) alternatively as an adjoint system involving





Sincethe convergent solution to this infinite time problem involves only
W
thestable roots of this adjoint system, it is straightforward to express the
paths for the states and costates in terms of the initial conditions for x and wF
the stable eigenvalues and vectors of the adjoint matrix Min(10).
It is convenient for this purpose first to define a vector of canonical











letting s,andndenotestable and unstable roots. The matrix Cappearing
in (11) is simply the matrix of column eigenvectors of M, so MC = CA,
where A is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues of M. Partitioning C as wh
shown and setting z,= 0provides the solution for the states and costates the
as follows: plaPolicy coordination and dynamic games 207
x(t) = C11 z=C11 x(t0),
(12)
p2(t)=C31Cj11x
The time paths for u and v in this open ioop Nash equilibrium may now
• be obtained by substitution of(12) into (9).
1.2 Closedloopor feedback Nash
In contrast to the open ioop case, it is now assumed that in
(9) minimising the same integral of costs each player observes and reacts to
the current state, x. In the Closed Loop Nash game each player takes as
given the feedback rule of the other, and these closed loop rules, u =R1x,
ing v = R2 x, alter the players' first-order conditions for cost minimisation.
• Specifically, when calculating the effect of a change in the state on each
player's Hamiltonian, account must be taken of the response of the other
:10) player to the change in the state.




and which, in comparison with equation (4) above, contains an extra expression
aH'av .
representing—-—---. Player2 similarly takes into account this closed loop
ical (IVtiX
behaviour of player 1, represented by u = R1 x.
As there are no other changes to the FOCs, then collected results for
the closed loop Nash equilibrium can be shown by augmenting those for
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where SOLN denotes the matrix appearing in equation (7) and are
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I
Forany given values of R1, R2, the system can be reduced by substitution
to the adjoint equations in states and costates
x x
p,= p1 (15) Siti.
p2 p2 des
In
and the solution paths may be obtained from the initial condition x(t0) and
1
the stable eigenvalues and eigenvectors of this adjoint system as described gan
in the last section. It is clear that the eigenvectors so determined will depend we
on the assumed reaction functions R1, R2. Given equation (9) above, it is and
necessary for the closed loop Nash equilibrium that these reaction poll
functions should simultaneously be related to the eigenvectors as follows: pro
R1.Jux+Jup,Hi+Jup21121 16() equ
R2 =+ 'UP2+P2 3





The values for R1, R2 which characterise the closed loop Nash equilibrium opti
may be determined by applying Jacobi's iterative method to the system
after 'modal decomposition', as follows. Given starting values for R1 and desc
R2, one may calculate the eigenvectors of These can then be used mini
to compute the Ricatti matrices, and112, and so a new set of values the I
for R1 and R2 (using equations (16) and (17) above). These new values may u, w
be substituted back into (14) and the procedure repeated until convergence
is obtained. This iterative method was used to compute the closed loop nam
solutions for the example in this paper. Typically R1 and R2 were set to
zero in the first iteration (which then generates the eigenvectors of the open
loop Nash solution in the first round).
An alternative procedure would be to apply numerical methods to the This I




R1 +112 B2 R, =0 J for
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TimeconsistentStackelberg equilibria
The dynamic games described so far have been symmetric. In many
situations, however, one player may be dominant and such a 'leader' can
15) design his policy in part with a view to inducing others ('followers') to act
in a manner beneficial to him.
snd The optimal strategy for the Stackelberg leader in an open ioop dynamic
bed game turns out to be time inconsistent, see Simaan and Cruz (1973), and
• we discussed such time inconsistent strategies in an earlier paper, Miller
it is and Salmon (1983). Here, however, we focus on those time consistent
:ion policies which may be obtained using the recursive techniques of dynamic
ws: programming.
In what follows, we first describe the time consistent Stackelberg
•(16) equilibrium derived for an asymmetric open loop game along the lines
developed by Cohen and Michel (1984); then the closed loop equivalent
reported earlier by Basar and Haurie (1982).
•ites,
1.3 Open loop Stackelberg equilibrium
(17) For the linear quadratic problem described in equations (1) and
(2) above, Hamiltonians are formed as shown in (3), for the leader,
player 1, and likewise for the follower. The first order conditions for
ium optimisation will, of course, be affected by strategic asymmetry.
,tem We begin with the conditions describing how the controls, u and v, are
and described as functions of the state and costate variables chosen so as to
used minimise the respective Hamiltonians. While the first order conditions for
tlues the follower are unchanged from the symmetric case, the leader, in setting
may u, will typically take advantage of the follower's reaction to his choice of u.
ence Thus, for the follower, v will be determined as in equation (7) above,
Loop namely
=x+ u+ Q2,,,,v+ =0 (19)
the This implies that
ime, V=
20(
(18) which will be taken into account by the leader, whose first order condition
for setting u therefore becomes
= =0 (21)T







as shown above, and
al-Il
=
As this asymmetry exists at a point in time, it does not lead to time
o1
inconsistency associated with intertemporal asymmetries.
Turning now to the conditions governing the evolution of the costate
variables p1 and p2, we note that, as the follower treats the leader's actions
as an open loop, the condition for j32 will be as in equation (9) above,
namely
= = Q2xxx+Q2xu (22)
Cohen and Michel have argued that Bellman's Principle of Optimality
in the open ioop Stackelberg game implies that the leader takes account
of the follower's behaviour as summarised here in equation (20), subject
not to equation (22) but to the 'time consistency' restriction that
W
p2=Ox (23)
where 0 is taken as given by player I but is endogenous to the system.
Formally, player I chooses u to minimise V1 subject to (2), (20) and (23).
As a consequence the first order condition describing the evolution of
d'
= = (24) b
where
R (25)
so R is similar to (but not identical with) a closed loop reaction function. eal





0 ___ 0 V
0 00 — I
where SOLNdenotesthe matrix appearing in (7) above, and R is defined
in (25).
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Equation(26) can be reduced to an adjoint equation in the state and





using the definition ofand the reduced form equations for u and v
obtained from (19) and (21) which we denote
rue
(28)
ate ] = Ifj a"
)flS P2
ye, using a slightly different notation to distinguish this form equation (9).
The equilibrium is defined by the requirement that the matrix 0




ect whereC21denote the stable eigenvectors of(27). This solution may be
C31 .1
23) obtained either by the Jacobi method used here, or alternatively by solving
the non-linear Riccati equations associated with this case.
1.4 Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
In much the same way, the closed loop asymmetric equilibrium
derived using dynamic programming methods by Basar and Haurie can
24) be described as an augmented version of the closed loop Nash game.
The asymmetry will as before mean that v and u are set as in (19) and
(21) above. But the closed loop assumption now implies that both players
are aware of the other's response to the state, so V1 is minimised subject
25) to (1) and v =R2xand V2 is minimised subject to (2) and u =R1x,with
,n. each player taking as given the other's reaction function. The resulting first
order conditions are almost identical to those for the closed loop Nash
game in (4). Specifically
r
A 00 B1 B2 0 0 x,
26) —P1 AT 0 R" 0 p1
—. I) A AT(3 (3 13 PT P2 1 p2
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Of course if the term =— iszero then this solution will
coincide with the closed loop Nash. Once again the system may be reduced




while the reaction functions both R1 and R2 appearing in MCLS must, for Cr




defined with respect to the stable eigenvectors of MCLS in (30).
NOTES Hal
*Inrevising this paper for publication we have benefitted substantially from
comments received at the Conference. Mi
I The reader is invited to compare the results obtained here for differential games
(and the methods used to obtain them) with those presented in the excellent
paper by G. Oudiz and J. Sachs included in this volume, which is cast in
discrete time and uses explicit dynamic programming methods to obtain time
consistent equilibria.
U
2Obtained using 'Saddlepoint'; see Austin and Buiter (1982).
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Ihave mixed reactions about the paper by Miller and Salmon. On the
favorable side, the authors make an interesting contribution to a growing214 Comment by Ralph C. Bryant
technical literature. Researchers working intensively on this topic will m
benefit from the paper (and the authors' earlier research on which it draws). A
On the negative side, the authors are not sufficiently clear about why the o
particular aspects of coordination studied here are the issues that most
merit analytical attention. Many readers will have difficulty extracting the ci
basic ideas from the technical presentation.
In this written version of my comments I omit specific comments about p:
the authors' model and their empirical results. Instead, I include only some p
general points that were sparked by my reading of the Miller—Salmon paper to
and some of the other papers presented at the conference. These points I
fall under three headings: the characterization of 'solutions' to problems G
of strategic interactions among national governments; the information and 0
uncertainty aspects of strategic interactions; and some questions about the T
recent preoccupation with 'time-consistent' policy strategies. cC
Cooperative and non-cooperative games fo
The conventional characterization of solutions to problems of
strategic interactions distinguishes between 'cooperative' and 'nonco- ci
operative' games. I formerly believed that this distinction was clear and CC
that it turned on whether the players in a strategic situation enter into re
binding agreements with each other. More recently, following conver-
sations with others much more conversant with game theory than I am ai
(for example, Edward Green), I have come to doubt the clarity of this ci
distinction. In particular, the concept of cooperation as customarily used ci
in game theory tends not to highlight the 'enforceability' and 'credibility'
aspects of an agreement. And it also fails to pay enough attention to the
'information structure' of the strategic situation.
Every strategic situation can be interpreted as having both 'efficiency'
and enforceability aspects. And every game has a particular information CC
structure.' The relative importance of the enforceability and the efficiency
aspects varies from one game to another, depending on the information
structure and the sequencing of decisions. For example, as brought out in
a'Stackelberg' solution can be interpreted as
just another Nash solution with a different information structure.
It is interesting to ask whether a steep tradeoff exists between efficiency e
and enforceability. Does it become more difficult to enforce a solution as
the players cooperate to reach an efficient outcome? Alternatively, are the
solutions that are most easily enforced and credible likely to be less
a'noncooperative' Nash solution
may be enforceable, yet quite inefficient. bep
A pessimist about cooperation would probably argue that there is,
inevitably, such a tradeoff. I am not clear about this question myself, and id
— - . - —— — -4
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my main purpose here is to identify the issue as one deserving careful study.
At this rudimentary stage of our knowledge, Itentatively hold an
s). optimistic view. That is, I nourish the hope that negotiators and analysts
he can be innovative, finding solutions for many types of games that are fairly
)st efficient and reasonably enforceable.
he International cooperation about national macroeconomic policies is a
prime example where I hope an optimistic attitude can be justified. As
)Ut pointed out in the earlier literature on this subject, the basic inhibitions
me to and potential gains from collective action apply to this area as well.2
There is no 'market' in the policy actions of national governments.
0. Governments cannot therefore feasibly 'trade' policy actions with each
—nd other. As a result, significant external economies or diseconomies can arise.
the There thus exists, in principle, a collective ('nonmarket') approach that
could bring about more efficient outcomes.
With strong political leadership, a particular efficient solution might be
found through bargaining that could make each nation better off. The
of optimistic view asserts that such a solution not only could be found but
could also be enforced. Enforceability requires innovative ideas for
Lnd containingthe 'free-rider' incentives to stay out of the bargaining or to
uto renege on the other players after a putative efficient solution has been
'er- bargained and agreed. For any foreseeable future, no international
am authority will be given strong enough powers to act as a policeman to
:his enforce international agreements. Hence agreements must be 'self-
sed enforcing' —consistentwith continued decentralized decisionmaking by
.ty' national governments.
the
Information and uncertainty aspects of strategic behavior
cy' Research on international coordination of economic policies
could develop in (at least) two ways. Analysts could explore the theoretical
icy aspects of strategic behavior using highly simplified models. This approach —
callit type 1 —permitsa sharp focus on particular analytical issues, a few
in at a time. Alternatively, analysts could try to develop the empirical aspects
as of the issues. As a necessary counterpart tr this other approach —
type2 —analystswill have to use empirical structural models of how
economies interact; these models must adequately capture the size and
• as nature of transmission of economic forces from one economy to another.
the This research by Miller and Salmon, most of the work being discussed
ess at this conference, and indeed the bulk of the interesting recent work by
ion others, has largely been type-I in nature. This theoretical emphasis has
been useful. We certainly have to be clearer about the conceptual and
is, theoretical aspects before we can make significant progress in applying the
tnd ideas empirically. At the same time we should not lose sight of the vast
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need for type-2 work. Theoretical clarity is a necessary, but very far from
sufilcient, condition for successful empirical application of the ideas. wi
In real-life discussions among national governments, the most funda- ch
mental obstacle to more cooperation is not a lack of awareness of the in
potential gains from coordination. Nor is it merely a lack of political will. dii
• To be sure, both those lacunae are important —especiallyin the last five of
years. Yet a still more important obstacle is the tremendous uncertainty
about the magnitudes, and even the signs, of cross-border transmissions an
of economic forces. pa
In the research discussed at this conference, the players know how ho
economic forces are transmitted from one nation to another. So to speak, of
everyone knows all the details of the relevant matrices in the correct tes:
structural model. And each player has the same model in mind. The
practical situation confronting policymakers in national governments is of
course entirely different.
Even if we cannot yet expect substantial progress in type-2 research, it thq
would be a big advance if we could learn how to put some explicit
recognition of uncertainty into our type-I research. For example, could
we incorporate some variances and covariances in our simplified models? ex
Following the lead of the literature started by Brainard (1967), could we ed
try to see how our inferences about strategic behavior and the potential an
gains from cooperation may be altered if we allow explicitly for uncertainty th
about what the true model is? A related approach would start by en
recognizing that two countries (players) disagree about the relevant model ho
characterizing their interdependence. Could we construct and then employ pr
a 'common model' that puts low or zero variance around the parameters
indispute, but high variances around the parameters where disagree-
ment is strongest?
In a similar vein, I offer a final comment about information and
uncertainty. Perhaps we are underplaying the importance of the 'mere' ho1
exchange of information among countries? It is true that an exchange of
information and forecasts is now virtually all that happens in international T\k
discussions about macr'economic policies. But it does not follow, as is Un4
often assumed, that this activity has negligible consequences. When basic cOl
uncertainty is so high, 'mere' exchanges of information about recent
developments and about national forecasts may be no small thing.
Credibility and time consistency is
The credibility and 'time-consistency' aspects of strategic inter-
actions have recently drawn the lion's share of attention in type-i research. sh
I am doubtful, however, that those aspects most warrant our analytical eff
attention —orat least in the narrow way typical of the recent work. of
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Thequestions about time consistency that bother me can be identified
m with the use of an analogy, the interactions between a parent and young
child. One may suppose that the interests of these two players are partly
in conflict: what the parent wants for the child at any point in time may
differ from what the child wants. Yet there is also a latent commonality
of objectives.
ye In particular, the child dislikes doing homework, likes to watch television,
and is often tempted to watch television before the homework is done. The
flS parent lays down behavior rules, including the requirement that all
homework has to be done before the TV can be turned on. It is a feature
of the situation that the game is 'repeated'; each day is potentially a new
test of the homework-before-TV rule.
T If the parent were to enforce the rule rigidly, the strategies of both parent
and child would be 'time-consistent' (in the sense now popular in the
technical literature). Now ask, however, whether it could be sensible for
it the parent to alter the rule, and if so in what circumstances.
•cit If the child has a tendency to procrastinate, behavior by the parent that
ild 're-optimizes' in a 'time-inconsistent' way can lead to trouble. For
Is? example, suppose the parent approves of the child watching certain
educational TV programs. If the child procrastinates with his homework
•jal and yet at 9:00 p.m. the parent relaxes the rule to permit the child to watch
ity the educational program, the parent's re-optimization can create a
by credibility problem. On future days the child may again procrastinate,
lel hoping to get the parent to relent again, even for non-educational
programs. This result would be an example where re-optimization can
induce poor outcomes averaged over longer runs. It is situations of this
type into which the recent literature has given us insights.
But now consider a different set of circumstances. Suppose at 3:00 p.m.
there is a power failure, which lasts until 8:45 p.m.; suppose the child's
e' homework is to practice typing, and the only typewriter in the house is
of an electric typewriter. Suppose again at 9:00 p.m. there is an educational
al TV program that the parent would like the child to watch. Given the
is unexpected event of the power failure, over which neither player had any
ic control, would a credibility problem be created if the parent permits the
nt child to watch TV? This particular re-optimization could be a constructive
breach of the homework rule.
For completeness, imagine a variant of the preceding case. Suppose there
is a past history of the child frequently procrastinating. Imagine again the
r- power failure, and again the desirable program on evening TV. How
h. should the parent react to the surprise power failure and its consequent
al effects on the homework? The parent's decision is more difficult because
of the past history. A possible relaxation of policy tonight may induce more
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procrastination in the future —eventhough the occasion for contemplating
the breach of the rule has nothing to do with the child's behavior today. ci
My analogy highlights credibility issues. Arguably, child-rearing may be
dominantly influenced by such issues. o
I now want to ask whether macroeconomic policy is very much, or only B
partly, like child rearing. One important difference, I would assert, is the ir
greater relative significance in macroeconomic policy of uncertainty about ai
how the rules affect behavior (how policy actions affect performance of
the economy). And a second important difference is the much greater
prevalence in macroeconomic policy of 'surprises'(like the power failure) N
that are exogenous from the perspective of individual decisionmaking
agents.
Think, for example, of the dilemmas facing policymakers in a significantly
open economy. Many types of disturbance originating elsewhere in the
world —wars,debt crises, crop failures —willinfluence the home economy.
Many types of nonpolicy shocks may also originate at home.
When uncertainty and unanticipated events are very important, the
virtues of unwavering adherence to 'time-consistent' strategies may be
much less clear than when the dominant elements of the situation are the
interactions between the players themselves. In particular, I conjecture that
there are many types of unexpected events for which it is desirable —from
the perspective of all players —tore-optimize after the surprise has
occurred. More generally, I believe that the recent literature has paid
insufficient analytical attention to strategic interactions in the light of
uncertainty and surprises.
I do not want to push the argument about exogenous surprises too far, R
because of the possibility that the subsequent endogenous interactions
among the players could be affected adversely by the relaxation of
B
time-consistent policies. Nevertheless, a great deal of macroeconomic a
policyhas to do with responding to contingencies that cannot be anticipated.
Policymakers in national governments have opportunities to get to know H
each others' behavior in international negotiations, and hence to form
reasonable judgments about credibility and reputations. With the current
state of knowledge of how the world economy functions, on the other hand,
they cannot anticipate many contingencies and cannot be confident about
how the consequences will be transmitted across national borders. Situations
mayoften arise, therefore, where it could be mutually advantageous for
all parties to be time-inconsistent, departing from presumptive rules agreed
at an earlier time.
These considerations led me to be a skeptic about whether the recent
fad in the profession —preoccupationwith credibility problems, and with
time-consistent strategies —isleading our research in the most fruitfulPolicy coordination and dynamic games 219
direction.3 Perhaps this trend is a bit like other aspects of the so-called
rational-expectations revolution? The new emphasis corrects a significant
be oversight in the previous literature. It forces us to ask important questions.
But we need to be careful not to get so swept up in the technically






ng I An outcome or 'solution' is efficient if it is Pareto-optimal. A solution is
enforceable if, once reached or agreed, the players have incentives to sustain
tly the behavior generating the solution.
he 2 See, for example, Niehans (1968); Hamada (1976); Bryant (1980) chapter 25;
ly. and Oudiz and Sachs (1984).
3 A possible confusion exists about the use of the term 'time consistency.' In
•h my comments I assert that re-optimization in response to exogenous surprises
C can —appropriately—leadto 'time-inconsistent' policies. At the conference, a
be few participants described such policies as 'innovation-contingent feedback
he rules' and preferred to label the policies as 'time consistent.' Terminology on
-iat these matters is still unsettled, and I have no semantic brief for my usage. My
essential point is that the credibility aspects of interactions among the agents
La in a game situation may be receiving excessive attention relative to the aspects
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hi
At the NBER Conference on Policy Coordination held in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, in August 1983, Marcus Miller and Mark Salmon presented St
some results from dynamic (differential) game theory.' This paper is an th
application of some of the results contained in that paper to the problem
of monetary policy coordination within the context of a specific two en
country macroeconomic model. My comments will be in two parts. First, hi
I will make some general remarks on dynamic game theory; secondly, I
will make some specific comments on their analysis:
I. Some remarks on dynamic game theory
The analysis of dynamic games has several critical interrelated ml
aspects. These include: (i) the type of strategic behavior being considered; oft
(ii) the information structure available to the policy maker; (iii) the choice
of policy instruments. I shall touch briefly on each in turn.
(i) Types of strategic behavior
Traditionally, two types of strategic behavior have been analyzed
using game theory, namely, noncooperative and cooperative. In the former, st
each agent acts independently, under alternative .assumptions regarding
the interaction of his behavior with that of his competitors. The two most ki
common assumptions are: (i) Nash and (ii) Stackelberg behavior. In the
former, each agent takes the actions of his competitors as given and reacts m
to them. A given set of policies for the agents is in Nash equilibrium when
there is no incentive for any one agent to deviate unilaterally from this if
equilibrium, with the other agents' policies being held fixed as given. In cal
the latter mode of policy making, however, there is a dominance and in p4
a two-player game one of the agents plays the role of a 'leader' and the
a'follower.' This case applies quite naturally in a situation where thl
the policy coordination involves a large country (leader) and a small
country (follower). In determining his equilibrium policy in the Stackelberg av
sense, the leader anticipates possible rational reactions of the follower to
his announced policy and optimizes his objective function accordingly. eqi,
These two solution concepts are familiar from static game theory. However,
they need refinement within a dynamic context, where a proliferation of
the equilibrium concepts with dynamic information patterns is possible. a
The most important consideration in an intertemporal context is that
over time games are played at different stages. Thus for example, the rules av1
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need to be clarified. For example, within the framework of multiact
dynamic games, the Stackelberg equilibrium concept is appropriate for the
class of decision problems in which the leader has the ability to announce
his decisions at all of his possible information sets ahead of time, a solution
e, which forces the leader to commit himself to the actions dictated by these
strategies. Thus the Stackelberg solution involves a prior commitment on
rn the part of the leader.2
m On the other hand, the leader may not have the ability to announce and
enforce his strategy at all levels prior to the start of the game. Such a
hierarchical equilibrium, which has a Stackelberg property at each level
I of play, is called a feedback Stackelberg solution. The leader may change
over time, depending upon the policies chosen by the agents and the
outcome of the dynamic process.
It is also possible that the policy makers in the two countries find it
mutually beneficial to coordinate their behavior and to achieve some kind
d; of cooperative equilibrium. This involves the optimization of some joint
ce utility function and is one of the solutions considered by Miller and
Salmon.
(ii) Information structure
A most important aspect of the solution involves the information
structure; see Basar and Olsder (1982). In a dynamic game, a precise
delineation of the information pattern, such as which economic agent
'st knows what, how the information pattern available to each agent evolves
he over time, how much of this is common information shared by all policy
ts makers, and what part of it constitutes private information for each agent,
is of paramount importance. An information set is said to be open-loop
iS if only the a priori raw data set is available at all points in time; in this
En case the policy variables depend only upon time and are called open-loop
in policies. On the other hand if there is some dynamic evolution of the
available information and the policy variables are allowed to depend upon
re this dynamic information, the information pattern is said to be closed-loop
or feedback, with the precise terminology depending upon what is actually
available and how it is utilized in the policy making process. Each one of
these information structures give rise to a different game and to a different
y. equilibrium structure, some of which are considered in the Miller—Salmon
r, paper.
The definition of the information set is particularly important in the
application of strategic behavior to international policy problems. In the
first place, certain variables such as exchange rates and interest rates are
available with much greater frequency than variables such as output or
ts
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employment. Secondly, policy makers are likely to have superior infor-
mation on domestic economic variables than they are likely to have on
analogous foreign variables.
(iii) Choice of policy instruments
Dynamic games are concerned with determining how policy
makers within each economy acting over time choose optimally among
some given set of policy instruments. A crucial point, unfamiliar to most
economists, is that even within a deterministic context, the choice of policy
instruments and the nature of the underlying information pattern is critical
to the equilibrium outcome of the differential game. This is in contrast to
a single country (agent) dynamic optimization context where, under the
assumption of uncertainty, such a choice is unimportant.
Since this distinction between traditional control theory and differential
games is so important, it requires further elaboration. Let us abstract from
stochastic disturbances and consider for the moment a single agent
optimization problem, such as a single government, the objective of which
is to tradeoff optimally between the rate of inflation and the rate of
unemployment. The optimal solution will be the same whether the policy
maker chooses to use say (i) only a fiscal instrument, (ii) only a monetary
instrument. (Of course the solution will be different if the policy maker
chooses to use both instruments simultaneously.) Furthermore, the end
result will be the same regardless of what observables these variables are
chosen to depend upon. That is, open-loop and closed-loop policies lead
to the same outcome, provided that the same instrument variables
are adopted.
By contrast, in the case of a dynamic game version of this problem,
involving say two policy makers, even if each policy maker uses only one
instrument, the equilibrium outcome will in general depend upon which
instrument is being used. Thus, for example, under given behavioral
assumptions, the equilibrium outcome will be different, depending upon
whether each policy maker is using a fiscal or a monetary (or for that matter
some other) policy instrument, and the precise nature of this policy
instrument. Consequently, the assumption of the specific policy instrument
takes on added importance in a dynamic context. The reason is simply
that the policy maker's reaction curve which conditions the optimization
of each of the agents depends upon the choice of policy instrument.3
Moreover, even if the choice of policy instrument is fixed, the information
pattern (whether open-loop orclosed-loop feedback information is available
to the agents) plays an important role in the characterization and existence
of equilibria as Miller and Salmon note, again in contrast to the single-agent
case.
a
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H. Specifics of the Miller—Salmon Analysis
I now comment on certain aspects of the Miller—.Salmon paper.
First, the consistency of the model is critically dependent upon the
'sluggishness' introduced by the core rate of inflation. Using their




to The first equation is very much like an expectations-augmented Phillips
he curve, where inflationary expectations (which we may identify with ir) are
formed adaptively. If one now takes the limiting case wherex,so that
ial the core rate of inflation converges to the current, the model tends to
degenerate. With co,i =irand the Phillips curve reduces to
• q5y+crDc=O (1)
of With symmetry, the analogous relationship in the rest of the world is
ICY
— = 0 (1')
•cer and combining these two equations yields
y+y*=O . (2)
ad Further, summing the IS curves for the two countries and noting (2) one
les finds
r+r*=O (3)
In the Miller—Salmon model, r and r* are policy instruments. However,
ch in the limiting case we have considered, the two policy instruments cannot
ral be chosen independently by their respective policy makers. Precisely the
same difficulty obtains under the assumption of symmetric economies if
er one adopts an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, together with the
cy assumption of rational expectations; indeed the two models are obser-
nt vationally equivalent.4 Thus in either case, the viability of the model
)ly depends upon some sluggishness being present. Equation (l)can be viewed
as being a manifestation of the ineffectiveness of policy under rational
expectations in the aggregate world economy. While due to relative price
effects, the output in one country can deviate from its natural level, this
)le is offset by a deviation abroad, so that on balance total output remains
ice unchanged.
In discussing the policy instruments, the authors comment that 'For the
design of monetary policy in such a structure it is not necessary to look
at the details of the monetary sector, as Driffill (1982) has pointed out.224 Comment by Stephen J. Turnovsky
This comment is perfectly appropriate in the context of the single agent
optimization model analysed by Driffihl. But as we have noted above in fu
my general remarks, the specification of policy is important in the context
of multiagent optimization problems. Miller and Salmon treat the real
interest rate as being the monetary instrument. Since this is not the usual
monetary policy instrument, it would be of interest to consider alternatives. wi
Indeed, in the context of multiagent games (either static or dynamic) one ex
can consider a monetary instrument problem analogous to that initially to
considered by Poole (1970) in a stochastic context. Should the monetary th
authorities target on the interest rate or some monetary aggregate? Or is ge
some combination of the two preferable? These seem to be interesting
questions to consider in the context of this model. fui
Intheir earlier paper, Miller and Salmon emphasize the problem of time
consistent solutions within an intertemporal optimization context. This
issue again arises in the present paper. This phenomenon frequently arises
in intertemporal optimization models involving forward looking behavior. al4
As a result, certain state variables are not tied to the past, but instead are
able to respond freely to unanticipated ,disturbances. They are often cod.
referred to as 'jump' variables and their associated costate variables
become zero at the initial point of optimization. The ability to re-optimize to
at each point of time implies that these costate variables, together with their
derivatives, must be zero at all times. Denoting the vector of relevant co
costate variables by p(t), this leads to an equation th
p(t) =p(t)=0 (4)
In effect, we get an additional dynamic equation and the question of time Co
consistency revolves around whether or not this additional equation
conflicts with the other dynamic equations of the system. Note that while th
conditions such as (4) constrain the dynamics a lot, time inconsistency need co
not always arise. th
Miller and Salmon eliminate the potential problem of time inconsistency in
by assuming that the time path of the real exchange rate is given, when pa$
the policy is designed. That is, they do not allow any jumps in the exchange fuzi
rate to occur, but instead constrain it to move continuously everywhere, as
I am somewhat uneasy about this procedure, since much of the current ap
work on exchange rate dynamics emphasizes its role as an information
variable and its ability to respond instantaneously to previously unantici-
pated shocks. I agree with the authors that their paradoxical ranking that va4
increased coordination leads to higher rather than lowerjoint welfare costs an
is probably a consequence of their neglect of the jump in the exchange be
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A simple way of capturing this possibility would be to augment the cost
in function to
xt .
al Mm C(E(O) —E0)J
+y2)dt (5)
al
where E0 is the inherited exchange rate, E(O) is the endogenously determined
exchange rate, following the jump, and C() is the cost function attached
ly to the jump. The idea is that when the policy is first introduced, the fact
that it is unanticipated will cause the exchange rate to jump. This in turn
is generates jumps in the relative price and output, which in turn impose
real adjustment costs on the economy. These are captured by the cost
function C.
For certain classes of cost functions, the problem of time inconsistency
us may be eliminated. This can be shown to be true, for example, if the cost
es associated with the initial jump is proportional to its absolute magnitude,
r. although not if it is quadratic.6 Basically, if such costs are sufficiently high,
re the costs of recomputing the optimal policy and the associated adjustment
costs these impose on the economy, are sufficiently large to eliminate the
es incentive for the government to revise its previously announced plan and
to cheat on the private sector.
:ir The introduction of a cost on unanticipated jumps in the exchange rate
at could I believe reverse the paradoxical ordering noted earlier, regarding
the welfare costs and increased coordination. With more coordination one
would expect the jump in the exchange rate to be mitigated, so that this
element in the overall cost function would decline with increased
cooperation between the policy makers.
n Of course, the specification of the cost function )isopen to the change
Ic that itis arbitrary and that itis not motivated by deep economic
d considerations. While this may or may not be the case, one can argue that
this criterion is just a special case of the more general criterion proposed
y in the control theory literature, from which the approach adopted in this
n paper is derived. A general statement of the intertemporal objective
function introduces costs on the initial and terminal states of the system,
as well as on the states and controls during the transition. In traditional
applications of control theory, the initial state is given, so the costs
n associated with those states are effectively bygones and are given as far as
any subsequent optimization is concerned. But when some of the state
variables, most notably in the present context the nominal exchange rate,
s are allowed to undergo initial jumps, a subvector of the initial state vector
e becomes endogenous and the costs associated with those initial variables
become an integral part of the overall optimization.226 Comment by Stephen J. Turnovsky
We may note further that the balancing of costs associated with initial
jumps in the system, together with those from having it deviate during the
transitional path from some desired target, was the motivation used to
justify some of the early distributed lag models; see the survey by Griliches
(1967). The modification of the cost function being proposed is along these
lines. Furthermore, we may argue that the entire linear-quadratic optimal
policy approach, although a convenient representation of the policy
maker's problem, is open to the charge of being arbitrary. The specification
of an initial cost function Cisno less so than the specification of the rest of
the cost functional.
We conclude with two further comments. First, the problem of time
consistency can be solved by seeking alternative solution concepts. This
is the procedure adopted by Oudiz and Sachs (1984) and is superior to
either the Miller—Salmon procedure or the modified cost function suggested
above. Secondly, instead of working with ad hoc macro models, it may
R be desirable to work with models based on private sector optimization. In
this case, the government's objective is to maximize the utility of the a
representativeindividual in the economy. In such models the derivation
of equilibrium often eliminates much of the dynamics, thereby possibly D
eliminating the problem of time inconsistency. To a large degree whether G
such models are characterized by time inconsistency depends upon how
thegovernmentpolicyvariablesimpact ontheprivatesector's
optimization.7
In summary, the methods of dynamic game theory provide a powerful 0
and fruitful approach to the study of macroeconomic policy making in
interdependenteconomies. The Miller—Salmon paper presents an interesting
application of techniques and serves as a promising start for further S
research in this area.
NOTES
1See Miller and Salmon (1983).
2 Further discussion of these issuesis given by Basar and Olsder (1982,
Chapter 3).
3 A simple static example illustrating this is given by Basar and Olsder (1982,
p. 193).
4 The typical specification of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve for an
open economy under rational expectations is
p =.;5ji +i
where y, I are as defined in the Miller—Salmon paper, p is the rate of inflationPolicy coordination and dynamic games 227
of domestic goods. Defininganalogously and letting e denote the rate of
ial exchange depreciation of the domestic currency, we have
:he
to whereis the share of the domestic good in domestic consumption. Writing
this equation as
e
icy it is seen that the expectations augmented Phillips curve reduces to
ion çby+(l—6)Dc=0
of which is equivalent to (I).
5 See p. 10 of the Miller and Salmon text.
me 6 This result is shown formally by Stemp and Turnovsky (1984).
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